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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STA'TE OF UTAH 
GEORGE A. CHASE, JR., 
Appellant, 
-vs.-
NICHOLAS G. 1\fORGAN, SR. 
CHARITABLE FOUNDATION, 
Respondent. 
Case Number 
8981 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
REPLY TO ADDITIONAL STATEMENT 
OF FkCTS 
Respondent's additional statement of facts contains 
matters which must be set in proper context for the Court 
to have a clear understanding of the issues of this case. 
First, Respondent 8ets forth an interrogatory to 
Appellant and the an8wer thereto, notwithstanding the 
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2 
Trial Uourt 's specific refusal to receive this evidence~ 
(Tr. 265) Set in proper context, Appellant's testimony 
taken and harmonized with the Answer to this Interroga-
tory shows that he was a middleman rendering a person-
al service, and not a seller of real estate as Respondent 
contends. 
Second, Respondent has set forth a portion of the 
Pretrial Order (Brief 7), where it is written "'The plain-
tiff will further contend that it had no agreement with 
defendant .. ," when the true text of the Pretrial Order 
was a statement in the alternative as follows: "The plain-
tiff will further contend that vf he had no agreement with 
defendant for the pay-1nent by defendant to plaintiff and 
his assignor, that he had an agreement with the Sierra 
Madre Oil Company ... '~ ( en1phasis added). Let there 
be no mistake that Appellant does clai1n an agreement 
with Respondent which i::; the smue agreen1ent the Trial 
Court found. (Finding of Fact X o. 10) 
Third, Respondent has published as a fact that it 
makes no clailn to- the last three payn1ents of $13,826.54 
each, totaling $41.-t-79.62, but that the Escrm\T Con1pany 
is holding one paym(lnt. and that it has paid two pay-
ments to tht~ President of Sierra .JJadre Oil Company, 
Donald MeDonald. Tlw eYidenee discloses that Respond-
('llt paid oYPr tla' uwnies aboYP in part upon the under-
standing that Sierra Madre Oil Company. Donald 
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McDonald and their attorney would stand behind the 
Respondent in resisting Appellant's claim. (Tr. 217, 218) 
Respondent, through its President, agreed with Arch 
MacDonald, who supplied the rnoney for Sierra 1\t.fadre 
Oil Company, that none of the funds here involved would 
be paid to either Sierra Madre or Dr. Donald McDonald, 
its Geologist President. ( Tr. 72, 73) 
STATEl\1:ENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT APPELLANT PER-
FORMED ONLY THE PERSONAL SERVI'CES OF A MIDDLE-
MAN AND DID NOT PERFORM THE SERVICES OF A 
BROKER. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT BARRED FROM RE,COVERY BECAUSE 
OF 'THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 
25-5-1 AND 25-5-4, SUBDIVISION 5. 
ARGUMEN1, 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT APPELLANT PER-
FORMED ONLY THE PERSONAL SERVICES OF A MIDDLE-
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MAN AND DID NOT PERFORM THE SERVICES OF A 
BROKER. 
Appellant's only duties under the contract with Re-
spondent were to find a prospective purchaser for oil and 
gas leases, and to introduce this prospective purchaser 
to Respondent. He had no authority and was not directed 
to do anything else. As soon as the introduction was 
made Appellants services \Yere at an end. He was not 
required under the contract to find a purchaser who was 
"ready, able and willing" to purchase the property, nor 
was he required to be present nor was he present during 
the negotiations between the prospective purchaser and 
the Respondent, and he had no pmver to influence the de-
cisions of the negotiating parties. These are the facts 
which fonn the basis for the clann that ~lppellant was a 
mere middle1nan, and whieh distinguish his services from 
those of a broker. Bespondent denied the existence of any 
agreement and therefore produced no evidence as to its 
terms. The Trial ·Court specifically found that such 
agremnent did exist. ~lll other eYidence in the record 
shows only an agremnent for the personal services of a 
middlmnan. K tnnerous eases with si1nilar facts were dis-
cussed in the argument of Point I (.:\.) of Appellant's 
Brief, and Appellant does not feel that it is necessary to 
di~en~s tlH'St' l'HSPs again. Appellant also feels that the 
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5 
question of the application of the Real Estate Brokers 
Statutes to the oil and gas business was adequately dis-
cussed, and does not require further discussion. 
Appellant has also pointed out the conflicting 
theories that prevail concerning the nature of an oil and 
gas interest, and that this Court has not decided whether 
an interest in an oil u-nd gas lease is "Real Estate." Sec-
tions 40-6-1, et seq. Utah Code Annotated) 1953 (1957 
Supp.), as also pointed out, seen1 to indicate that the 
Lessee's interest is only the right to appropriate the oil 
and gas produced, the logical conclusion therefore being 
that the interest, is in the nature of a profit a pendre, and 
not real estate. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT BARRED FROM RE,COVERY BECAUSE 
OF THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH ·CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 
25-5-1 AND 25-5-4, SUBDIVISION 5. 
Plaintiff has heretofore argued that an interest in an 
oil and gas lease is not "real estate" and should not be 
governed by the statutes concerning real estate brokers, 
but Plaintiff does not make any claim to an interest in 
any real estate conveyed, and the provisions of 25-5-1, 
requiring a writing for conveyances of real estate, are, 
therefore, not in issue here, 
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Plaintiff is Inaking a claiin for cmnpensation for his 
personal service rendered in the sale of oil and gas leases. 
Assuming for the purpose of argument that the leases 
in question are real estate, the Court did not err in hold-
ing that 25-5-4 ( 5) did not preclude recovery. This Court 
is not committed to the doctrine that before recovery may 
be had for services rendered in the sale of real property, 
such services must be rendered pursuant to a written 
agreement. The doctrine to which the Court is committed 
is that a recovery for such services must be based on an 
express agreement for such services, and this agreement, 
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing, sub-
scribed by the party to be charged there·with. Case v. 
Ralph, 56 Utah 243, 188 Pac. G±O, and Smith Realty Co. 
v. Dipietro, 77 Utah 176, :29:2 Pac. 915, did not decide the 
question of whether or not this express agreement must 
be in writing. Both of those cases merely held that the 
pleadings therein did not plead an express contract, and 
they, therefore, did not state a cause of action. X or do 
the cases of lllifflin c. Shiki, 77 Utah 190, 293 Pac. 1, and 
Barnard v. Hardy, 77 Utah :218, :2~)3 Pac. 12, stand for 
that proposition. Those cases were decided against the 
broker because the properties "·ere sold under different 
terms than were found in the broker~· contracts. Neither 
<·a~P held that the l'xpress agreement n1ust be in writing. 
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Ney v. Ho/rri-0on) 5 Utah (2d) 217, 299 P. (2d) 
1114, is the latest pronouncement of this Court concern-
ing Section 25-5-4(5). In that case there was ample evi-
dence to prove an express oral contract to pay a conlmis-
sion for the sale of defendants' property. The earnest 
money contract on which the sale \vas rnade contained a. 
provision which recited the terms of the sellers' agree~ 
ment to pay a commission and was signed by_ the de~ 
fendant. The Supreme Court held that this memorandun1 
was sufficient to satisfy the statute, and held : 
A memorandun1, in order to make enforce-
able a contract within the statute, may be any 
document or writing, formal or infonnal, signed 
by the party to be charged ... which states with 
reasonable certainty: 
(a) each party to the contract either by his 
own nmne, or by such a description as will serve 
to identify him ... and 
(b) the land, goods or other subject-matter 
to which the contract relates, and 
(c) the terms and conditions of all the 
promises constituting the contract and by whom 
and to whmn the prmnises were made. 
The Supreme Court further stated: 
... our statute, unlike that of many states, 
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8 
does not call for the contract itself to be in wr.it-
ing; it is enough if there is "some note or memo-
randum thereof" which evidences the contract. 
(l~Inphasis added) 
The rule, therefore, is: An oral contract to pay a 
commission, entered into before the services are rendered, 
and later reduced to a note or memorandum, signed by 
the party to be charged and setting forth the terms of 
the contract, will satisfy the statute. 
The Trial Court properly held that the letter sent 
to plaintiff by defendant fully satisfies the requirements 
set down inN ey v. Harrison, supra, to wit: 
(a) it is signed by the party to· be charged; 
(b) it states \\'ith certainty the parties to the con-
tract, the subject-1natter of the contract and 
the tenns and conditions of the contract. 
UOXCLUSIOX 
Appelant perfonned personal serYices under a con-
tract with Respondent, which contract was evidenced by 
a written meuwrandu1n. Appellant has not been compen-
sated for thel"\P l"\PrYiePl"\ and Respondent has ad1nitted that 
it does not <'laim the uwney. 'rhe Trial Court should 
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9 
therefore be ordered to grant judgment as prayed for 
by Appellant. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
BEN D. BROWNING and 
JOHN H. ALLEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
1020 !{earns Building, 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
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